CORRECT IDEAS AND SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM IN CHINA: THE CASE OF SHANGHAI'S TOWNSHIP INSURANCE
In China, the diversity of schemes results from the fact that the central government provides guidelines on social policy which it allows provincial, city or county officials to modify in accordance with local needs and capacities (Whiteford, 2003; Frazier, 2004) . 1 Since 2003, the central government has sought to stress the importance of extending social security coverage to all Chinese citizens. It has done so using the rhetoric of social justice.
In this chapter we begin with a general discussion of that rhetoric before analyzing its use in media coverage of a new social insurance scheme, town insurance (zhen bao), designed primarily to provide benefits for land-deprived peasants (in the form of "exchanging land for social security") and low-income earners. It was first introduced by the Shanghai municipal government in November 2003 to residents living in towns surrounding Shanghai. Following our analysis of the social justice rhetoric, we consider the attitudes of people living in Shanghai to social security and compare them with the attitudes of people living in three other major cities; namely, Beijing, Guangzhou and Chengdu, using data from surveys undertaken across the major cities of China in 2002 and 2003.
That survey, which reveals significant concerns over social security, provides an important context for understanding the government's interest in convincing the Chinese people that its policies are improving their social and personal security. Finally, we examine the extent to which people in the towns surrounding Shanghai are actually made better-off by the introduction of town insurance in 2004. We draw on three unique datasets for our analysis: two surveys administered in 
SOCIAL JUSTICE AS A CORRECT IDEA
We derive our title from Mao Zedong's 1963 essay, "Where Do Correct Ideas Come From?" Mao's question was rhetorical because he had already provided the answer in the same Central Committee document in which his "Correct Ideas" essay appeared. 2 He named three kinds of social practice that can generate "correct ideas": "the struggle for production, the class struggle and scientific experiment." Some forty years later, the same party-state (transformed under the post-1978 aegis of Deng Xiaoping's leadership), is once again seeking to define a new set of correct ideas. Ironically, it now finds itself (under the leadership of President Hu Jintao) in the contrary position of having to deal with threats posed by "class struggle" on the part of those disadvantaged by the forces of capitalist production (whether in the form of mass protests, acts of civil disobedience, or the numerous petitions and cases of injustice or unfair treatment brought by citizens before the courts and government bureaus).
That President Hu has sought to praise Mao in public has led at least some mainland Chinese intellectuals to note his distinct departure from the Party rhetoric produced under Deng Xiaoping's and Jiang Zemin's leadership. 3 Hu has espoused an oftrepeated public commitment to improving the lives of peasants, while, at the same time, the government he leads continues to impose severe restrictions on freedom of speech. This has led at least one Western journalist to use the headline "Hu Jintaobad for intellectuals, good for peasants" to typify the kind of socially responsible dictatorship that the party-state currently practices (Mooney, 2005) . Given the untold instances of official corruption and injustices that have accompanied China's economic development, it is not surprising that, in recent years, Party theorists have resorted to promoting "social justice" (shehui gongzheng) as the kind of correct idea to guide further development. Social security (shehui baozhang) is now frequently affirmed as social justice in the official discourse, in part, to assuage a restive public that had previously relied on the Communist state for such protection. For instance, leading Party theorist Wu Zhongmin emphasizes that "the system of social security is a basic institutional arrangement that embodies social justice" while linking social justice to the market-oriented ideal of "social distributions based on middle income earners as the dominant social group" (Wu, 2006) . In this regard, Wu argues that China's present-day social structure is "neither healthy nor conducive to the establishment of a harmonious society" since "more than 80 % of the urban population is comprised of low or low-to-middle income earners while middle incomer earners make up only around 10 to 15 % of the population." Wu's understanding of social justice is specifically tied to the market-oriented goal of achieving an ideal social distribution that is "small at either end and big in the middle," that is, with middle incomer earners as the vast majority and tiny minorities of the very rich and very poor at either end. What he also implies is that social security will remain inadequate as long as the majority of China's urban population, as members of the working poor, are unable to afford the costs of such security. Rhetoric aimed at demonstrating the government's commitment to the construction of a socialist market regime on behalf of "the people" (as opposed to a re-emergent capitalist class) has increased as socioeconomic inequalities have sharpened in the 2000s. In using the rhetoric of social justice, the Party-state seeks to reassure "the people" that it is using correct ideas to respond to the social problems and injustices that have resulted from inequalities as well as corruption that have accompanied China's rapid economic growth. This is partly because aggrieved citizens have also become much more vocal in reminding the state of its socialist claim to legitimacy and of promises of egalitarianism made during the Maoist past. One famous example is the case of Wang Shanbao, a retrenched 55-year-old worker whose protest in 2001 took the form of drawing sketches of Chairman Mao on the pavement outside his factory, which drew daily crowds until the factory managers gave him back his job (Forney, 2003) .
Most recently, President Hu Jintao's report to the Seventeenth Party Congress in October 2007 was praised in an editorial for displaying exemplary concern with social justice. The editorial noted that social justice was "embodied" in five sentences featured in Hu's report: namely, "students get taught, workers get paid, diseases get treated, the aged get cared for, and residents have somewhere to live" (Gao, 2007) .
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PROMOTING TOWN INSURANCE AS SOCIAL JUSTICE
The state-controlled media's promotion of Shanghai's town insurance scheme reflects a deliberate attempt to legitimize market-oriented social security as socialist justice at work. When the central government shifted responsibility for social security from the "work unit" to "society" in 1991, it effectively signaled the replacement of its former state-funded collectivist pooling scheme with market oriented models that draw on both individual accounts and existing city-and county-level pools. The new approach was formalized in the 1991 State Council Decision on Pension System Reform for Workers and Staff of Urban Enterprises. This meant that the five key items in China's "social insurance" regime -pension, industrial injury, maternity, medical and unemployment insurance -were being shifted from the state to employers (in the form of payroll tax) and employees (in the form of wage deductions) (Whiteford, 2003, pp. 49-51; Frazier, 2004, pp. 102-103) . Over time, the difficulties that local governments encountered in ensuring compliance from enterprises led the central government to transfer the financial and administrative responsibilities of managing social insurance contributions from enterprise managers to city officials. 5 This enabled China's various municipal governments to each produce its own social insurance schemes. Shanghai's Interim Social Insurance Procedures for Small Cities and Townships within Shanghai Municipality, known in popular parlance as Shanghai's town insurance (zhenbao) scheme or simply as the 25+X model, has been publicized in the Chinese media as an exemplary scheme in this highly decentralized approach to social security reform. 6 Relative to other cities, Shanghai has better prospects of effective policy implementation because its administrative structure has evolved in the last two decades towards the goal of making the city into an international metropolis (Yusuf and Wu, 2001). The successful implementation of Shanghai's town insurance scheme quickly led other Chinese cities to adopt similar models, with the Tianjin government announcing in April 2005, just eighteen months after Shanghai's town insurance was launched, that it would implement its own town insurance scheme. 7 Prior to the introduction of Shanghai's town insurance in late 2003, the urban insurance scheme or city insurance (chengbao) introduced in 1986 was the major social insurance scheme in Shanghai. Under city insurance, employees receive mandated contributions equal to 48% of the employee's wage (paid to a state insurance fund), with 37%from the employer and 11% from the employee, and with both employer and worker being offered tax incentives to induce them to top up the mandated rate. Those eligible for city insurance include all employees working in a firm registered in Shanghai proper as well as employees with a non-agricultural household registration (hukou) working in state or public bodies registered in rural areas surrounding Shanghai proper. Prior to the introduction of town insurance, some non-state employers in the rural areas surrounding Shanghai voluntarily offered some of their employees coverage under the urban insurance scheme in order to attract and retain good staff. This, however, did not apply to all employees. The town insurance scheme commenced in November 2003 to offer basic social security to land-deprived peasants and to provide social insurance coverage to those in the outer areas or suburbs of Shanghai who were not covered by the urban social insurance scheme. As of August 2006, there were 1.31 million people enrolled in the town insurance scheme. 8 The town insurance scheme is also known as 25+X for the following reasons. The 25% base consists of 17% for pension, 2% for unemployment, 5% for medical treatment and 0.5% each for maternity and industrial injury insurance.
The X component consists of X1 for commercial pensions, X2 for medical insurance and X3, which is a two-year allowance for farmers who have lost their land. Under the 25+X scheme employees are not compelled to pay anything unless a minimum contribution is required by the local council for medical treatment. Both employers and employees are encouraged to top up the 25% contribution through the XI component by the use of tax incentives with the magnitude of the X1 to be negotiated between employer and employee. X3 is mandated for companies that have appropriated land and is used to compensate those farmers who have lost their land as part of Shanghai's urban expansion. Such persons are entitled to the basic 25% insurance in the form of a 15-year lump-sum that is placed in an account managed by the BOLSS in Shanghai, a non-agricultural hukou and the X3 allowance of 290 RMB per month for 24 months that is intended to assist in finding a new job. Designed as a multipurpose scheme, town insurance was nonetheless focussed on compensating land-deprived peasants with social security benefits both to expedite the process of urbanization and to prevent social unrest. For instance, at the workshop Urbanization should be accompanied by the proper treatment of land-deprived peasants (Chengshihua xu shandai shidi nongmin) held on 18 September 2003 by the party newspaper Jiceng dang jian (Grass-Roots Party Construction) and involving five directors of Chinese research institutions that deal with rural socio-economic problems, Shanghai's town insurance scheme was highly commended well over a month before its actual implementation. 9 As an example of municipal governments' recourse to the mass media in disseminating their policies, that workshop gave town insurance its stamp of expert (not merely official) approval. Media reports about the scheme have consistently emphasized the benefits it will provide for Shanghai's poor. The following newsreport that appeared in the 9 May 2004 issue of the Party organ Liberation Daily (Jiefang ribao) is a typical example. Entitled "500,000 people in Shanghai's suburbs to join social security scheme by year's end," the report begins as follows: Even on the days when she is not due to collect her pension under the town insurance scheme, Hua Xinfang , a 61 year-old peasant whose land was requisitioned for Fengxian Bay's tourist site, will often take out her "social security card" (shehui baozhang ka) to have a look at it. She said, "I've waited for this for a very long time. This card now gives me the same form of protection as urban residents." According to statistics, Shanghai peasants like Hua Xinfang who have joined the town insurance scheme now number over 210,000. By year's end, this number will further increase to 500,000. 10 The report then explains that although the scheme is commonly known as "town insurance" (zhenbao), it is also referred to as 25+X because the mandated 25% contribution rate provided by a social pooling fund is supplemented by an 'X' factor to which enterprises and individuals can contribute in a "flexible" (linghuo) manner, using variable rates and levels of contribution. The report then quotes an unnamed official from the city's Agricultural Committee as saying, approvingly, that the policy's "basic minimal platform [you di pingtai], its flexibilty [you tanxing] and extensive coverage [guang fugai]" are features that will "progressively reduce the difference in social security for peasants and urbanites." Having quoted this official endorsement, the report returns to the human aspect of the policy: Hua Xinfeng is very happy because she has signed up for town insurance. Pointing to the new trousers she was wearing, she said, "With town insurance, I feel that my life will be protected from now on. I made a point of buying cloth, at a cost of 67 RMB per meter, to make these trousers. Before I signed up for town insurance, I simply would not have bought this cloth." The report further notes that whereas the former "rural pension" (nongbao) paid an average of 80 RMB a month to each recipient, the town insurance (zhenbao) scheme would enable recipients to each receive over 300 RMB a month. It claims that the implementation of town insurance has been "welcomed by vast numbers of peasants whose land had been requisitioned," quoting another recipient, 68-year-old Zhang Mingzhang as "praising it profusely," noting how he and his wife now receive "a total of 664 RMB in pensions," "along with refunds for medical and hospital expenses." Zhang is also reported to have said that "everyone in the family says that this is a very good thing [yijian da hao shi), an enormously practical thing [da shishi] that the government is doing on behalf of the peasants." The report also quotes a representative from the BOLSS as emphasizing that the implementation of the town insurance scheme is designed to ensure that all citizens are adequately protected, regardless of their hukou status. Since the publication of that news report, numerous others have appeared that typically feature endorsements of Shanghai's town insurance by peasants, workers and official spokespersons. The often repeated virtues of a "basic minimal platform," "flexibilty" and "extensive coverage" claimed on behalf of town insurance resonate with Wu Zhongmin's description of social justice as embodied in "the principles of baseline subsistence and basic respect, principles of equal opportunity and of fair distribution according to contribution as well as principles of social adjustment" (Wu, 2006). As state propaganda, these newsreports about town insurance are intended to educate the reading public about the market-oriented aspect of social security, with the social justice aspect being fleshed out in the story's human angle. But what is conspicuously absent from these feel good reports about town insurance is the undesirable impact that the scheme can have and has had on those workers who previously received coverage under the urban insurance model and whose employers are now providing coverage under the town insurance scheme. In the numerous positive reports about town insurance, significant disparities between the new scheme and the existing urban scheme are simply not discussed. We have only been able to locate one article that actually examines some of these disparities. Published in The Bund in March 2004, the article reported that three hundred local employees of the Shanghai-based Haoyouduo Management Consulting Service Co. Ltd (a subsidiary of Taiwan's Haoyouduo Group) were told in 2004 that they would keep their jobs on condition that they enrol in town insurance. 11 As these employees previously received coverage under the urban scheme, the coerced shift to town insurance meant that their social insurance was greatly diminished. For the company, however, enrolling its employees in town insurance meant a huge saving in social insurance expenditure. The article reported that the slight salary increase that was the trade-off for these employees was regarded by many as insufficient compensation and that, as a consequence, some thirty to forty of these employees chose to resign than to enrol for town insurance. Ready access to useful and reliable information about town insurance has undoubtedly contributed to the efficiency with which district governments were able to enrol large numbers of people into the scheme. But because the scheme was set up with a distinct focus on compensating land-deprived peasants in the process of rapid urbanization underway in Shanghai's outer suburbs, it was also vulnerable to policy changes on land development and use.
Shanghai's town insurance continued to enjoy overwhelmingly favorable media coverage until February 2007 when the widely-read Economic Observer (Jingji guancha bao) published a report outlining the enormous financial difficulties that district governments faced in their efforts to deliver town insurance to land-deprived peasants. That this bad news first appeared in Economic Observer is not surprising since it is one among a growing number of state-controlled newspapers that have earned a reputation for editorial independence (Zhang, 2007) . The report noted that because Shanghai's district governments financed the town insurance scheme through revenues derived from land transfers, the introduction of stringent regulations and controls on the use and development of land in 2006 produced a sharp drop in the revenues of district governments, making it extremely difficult for them to continue financing the town insurance scheme as compensation for land-deprived peasants. The central government-mandated constraints on land use and development in 2006 are intended to facilitate effective development and to improve administrative transparency. They also had the effect of drastically reducing the revenue that Shanghai's district governments had become accustomed to receiving through land transfers. Under these circumstances, the capacity of district governments to continue financing town insurance for land-deprived peasants has become highly uncertain. Further complicating this growing concern over the financial capacity of Shanghai's district governments to fund town insurance is the pension scandal that unfolded in Shanghai in the later half of 2006. Leading Party and state officials in Shanghai, including the Party Secretary Chen Liangyu and the Director of the BOLSS Zhu Junyi, were sacked for allowing the misappropriation of some 10 billion RMB in total from Shanghai's municipal pension and social security funds as capital investment in speculative real estate deals. 12 For these reasons, the extension of social security coverage that remains a key objective of Shanghai's town insurance is not only dependent on the financial and administrative capacities of the municipal and district governments but at clear risk of being derailed by widespread corruption in the management of social security funds. Thus, while Shanghai's town insurance clearly accords with the characteristics of "social justice" that the Party is keen to promote, it is much less clear whether there are sufficient funds for its continued viability as compensation for land-deprived peasants.
CITIZENS' CONCERNS OVER SOCIAL SECURITY
Surveys of the public's major concerns have repeatedly found that social security is the public's top concern. In one recent survey by the Beijing-based Horizon Research Consulting Group of 3,780 residents in five cities including Beijing, Guangzhou and Shanghai and five small cities and towns in Liaoning, Sichuan and Zhejiang provinces found that social security was the number one concern of urban residents followed by employment and education. 13 These findings explain why the central government has been so keen to promote itself as delivering social justice through social security reform. In this section of the chapter we utilize data from two surveys administered in September 2002 and 2003 by the China Mainland Marketing Research Company (CMMRC) of 10,000 urban residents across China's 32 major cities. 14 The CMMRC surveys ask a range of questions relating to urbanites' perceptions of changes in living standards, economic circumstances, household expenditure, and demographic characteristics. CMMRC employs multistage stratified random sampling to ensure a representative sample in terms of age, gender and income. The respondents are interviewed either in person or via telephone by a trained interviewer and all responses are checked for accuracy both by a supervisor on location and subsequently at the CMMRC offices in Beijing before being entered into the data base. In what follows we compare the attitudes of residents in Shanghai with residents in Beijing, Guangzhou and Chengdu. We focus on Shanghai in order to get an insight into how the populace viewed social insurance and social protection and the extent to which people accepted that government practice is improving their social insurance position just prior to the introduction of the town insurance scheme. We use Beijing and Guangzhou as comparators for Shanghai given their importance as major cities in China's booming coastal region. We selected Chengdu as a comparator, given its importance as a major city in the less-developed western region of China. GDP per capita in Guangzhou is similar to Shanghai. GDP per capita in Beijing is lower than Guangzhou and Shanghai, but still one of the highest among the major cities of China, while GDP per capita in Chengdu is just over a third of that in Guangzhou and Shanghai. 15 In the two surveys, respondents were asked to nominate the three domestic social issues about which they had been most concerned throughout the year. Across the total sample for the 32 cities, social insurance was nominated by the largest percentage of respondents as a 'top three' problem of concern in both 2002 (45.5%) and 2003 (50.1%). In 2002, respondents were asked to rate how serious they considered social insurance and the bad management of social welfare to be. Cumulative percentages across categories 'extremely serious', 'quite serious', 'serious' and 'not too serious' showed 62.1% of respondents considered this social problem to be at least 'serious'. Nearly 35% (34.3%) considered it at least 'quite serious', while 7.7% considered it 'extremely serious'. Table 1 gives a breakdown of the data across cities. looking at these perceptions by location, fewer respondents in Shanghai considered social insurance to be a serious social problem than those in Beijing, Guangzhou or Chengdu. Of the four cities, the greatest concern was expressed amongst residents in Chengdu, reflecting that city's less sophisticated social security regime relative to the three major more economically developed coastal cities.
----------------Insert Table 1 -----------------An ordered probit model was employed to ascertain effects of gender, age, income and location on perceived seriousness of social insurance as a social problem in 2002. 16 The dependent variable was coded on a five point scale from 1 (extremely serious) to 5 (not too serious). The results are reported in Table 2 . Household income and residing in Shanghai were significant predictors at the 5% level. Respondents with a higher household income and those residing in Shanghai were more likely to perceive social insurance as 'not too serious' a problem. The results for household income are consistent with the notion that the market reforms in China have created winners and losers (Nielsen, et al. 2005) . Those with low household income, including the retired and the unemployed, have been made more vulnerable by the reforms and are, thus, more likely to be concerned about social insurance coverage. The results for Shanghai suggest that the government has had more success in convincing residents in Shanghai that the social insurance situation is not as serious as in other parts of China. This result also reflects the fact that Shanghai is more affluent and has a more developed administrative structure than other cities in China. Tables 2 & 3  -----------------------The results in Tables 1 and 2 potentially mask considerable differences in perception across types of social insurance. The 2002 CMMRC questionnaire also asked respondents to nominate which form of social insurance they thought needed to be strengthened. Table 3 shows the percentage of respondents who endorsed a strengthening of each type of insurance by location. Shanghai had the lowest percentage of respondents across the four cities who thought pension insurance should be strengthened, but the highest percentage who thought that unemployment insurance, maternity insurance and poverty relief should be strengthened. While actual reports of migrants taking the jobs of urban residents are scant, the results for unemployment insurance could reflect a widespread perception amongst Shanghaiese that, at a time of substantial lay-offs from the state-owned sector, migrant workers are taking the jobs of urban residents. This fear has had an important influence on government policies with local officials viewing migrants as a burden on their cities. This has manifested itself in subtle forms of discrimination. For example, prior to 2004 Shanghai employers using migrant labor were required to contribute 50 RMB to an unemployment fund for each migrant laborer they employed. The proceeds from this fund were used exclusively to assist unemployed permanent urban workers (Feng et al, 2002 ).
--------------------Insert Tables 4-6 ----------------------
With respect to aged pension, medical and unemployment insurance, we employed a binary logit model to determine the effects of gender, age, income and location on perceptions that each of these insurances should be made a priority to strengthen. In each case the dependent variable was coded one if the respondent considered that pension, medical or unemployment insurance should be strengthened and was coded zero otherwise. Tables 4 through 6 show the logit coefficients, Wald tests, and odds ratio for each of the predictors. Females were 1.15 times more likely to endorse the strengthening of pension insurance than were males. Older residents were 1.13 times more likely to endorse strengthening pension insurance than were younger residents, but Shanghai residents were less likely (.62) to endorse strengthening pension insurance than non-Shanghainese. Females were 1.20 times more likely to endorse the strengthening of medical insurance than were males. Older residents were 1.10 times more likely to endorse strengthening medical insurance than were younger residents. Residents of Beijing were 1.64 times more likely to endorse strengthening medical insurance than were non-Beijing residents, but Shanghai residents were less likely (.78) to endorse strengthening medical insurance than non-Shanghainese. Females were less likely (.89) to endorse the strengthening of unemployment insurance than were males. Older residents were less likely (.89) to endorse it than were younger residents. Those with a higher household income were less likely to (.96) to endorse strengthening unemployment insurance than were those with a lower income. While residents of Shanghai were 1.95 times more likely to endorse the strengthening of unemployment insurance than were non-Shanghainese, residents of Chengdu were less likely (.80) to endorse it. In 2003, respondents were asked about their perception of the change in social insurance relative to the preceding year. In 2003 the central government spent some 70 billion RMB on social insurance expenditure for laid-off workers, retirees, pensioners, the unemployed, those who had suffered work-related injuries and those on maternity benefits, representing a 19.9% increase on the previous year's allocation. However, in the CMMRC survey, 25% of respondents indicated there had been "no change" in the level of social insurance. Half (52.2%) of the sample indicated that there had been at least 'some improvement', while 12.8% indicated that there had been some degree of fall. We examined the effects of gender, age, income and location on these perceptions using an ordered probit model. The dependent variable was coded on a five-point scale from 1 (there had been considerable improvement) to 5 (there had been a considerable fall). The results are ported in Table 7 . Household income and residing in any of Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou or Chengdu were significant predictors. Respondents with a higher household income as well as those residing in any of these four cities were more likely to perceive that social insurance had improved in the preceding year.
--------------------Insert Table 7 -------------------Overall, interpreting the findings in terms of the success of the present-day Chinese government's portrayal of itself as actively engaged in improving the welfare of its citizens we can conclude that issues of social security were most important to residents across both 2002 and 2003. Almost without exception, social insurance dominated as the most important issue across each location in both years. In terms of degrees of seriousness, in 2002 more than half of the residents in each location thought social insurance to be at least 'serious'. Shanghai residency and household income were important predictors of these perceptions, such that the Shanghainese and those from higher income households were less likely to think social insurance a serious problem. When asked in 2003 whether social insurance had changed in the preceding year, 52.2% indicated that it had improved to some degree. Those who were more likely to report a positive change in social insurance were those with higher household incomes. As about half (47.8%) the respondents indicated that social insurance had either not changed or had become worse, this explains why the Chinese government has been keen to portray itself from 2004 onwards as being focussed on improving the social welfare of its citizens, especially the poorest urbanites. Next, we consider Shanghai's township insurance -a scheme introduced with the specific purpose of extending social security coverage to the rural poor and low income earners -and whether it has lived up to the rhetoric of social justice.
HAS SHANGHAI'S TOWNSHIP INSURANCE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN EXTENDING COVERAGE?
In this section we draw on a unique dataset supplied by the BOLSS on 103,095 individuals, which is the entire population of people who had joined the town insurance scheme in one district of Shanghai as at the end of 2004. For each individual the data contains information on their insurance status prior to joining the new scheme, whether the person was a displaced farmer and whether the person was receiving the X1 component or commercial pension insurance over the 25% basic contribution and some basic demographic information. The district is 40 kilometres from downtown Shanghai. At the end of June 2005, the area had a total population close to one million; of which 36% had an urban hukou, 16.5% had a rural hukou and the remaining 47.5% were migrants. By the end of 2004 the 'local workforce' (excluding migrants) was about 350,000 with 73% working in the manufacturing sector, 19% in the service sector and 8% in agriculture. In 2000 there were 267,000 employees with a local hukou; of which 51% had urban insurance and 49% had rural insurance or nothing. By the end of 2004, just over one year after the introduction of town insurance, of the 90% of the then approximately 350,000 employees with a local hukou, 35% had urban insurance, 30% had rural insurance or nothing and 30% had joined the town insurance scheme. The remaining 5% were in a transition phase between the rural insurance and town insurance schemes. Prior to being transferred into town insurance, individuals were either a) under the urban social insurance scheme, b) under the rural insurance scheme or c) had no insurance coverage at all. In our data, the latter two categories were grouped together into a single 'rural insurance or no insurance' category. Within the group originally under the urban social insurance scheme there were two sub-groups: one group who traded their land use rights and one group who had never had land use rights. All members of the group that previously had either rural insurance or no insurance traded their land use rights. Figure 1 depicts each group in terms of their land use rights status and social insurance position prior to joining the town insurance scheme.
Amongst the 103,095 individuals, 42,840 (41.6%) had previously been insured under the urban insurance model and 60,255 (58.4%) had either been insured under the rural social insurance scheme or had no insurance. Of the total number of people covered under the town insurance scheme in the district, 98,103 (95.16%) had enjoyed land rights that had been reacquired. Of these 98,103 individuals, 60,255 had previously had land use rights with either rural insurance or no insurance at all. While some of this group of 98,103 had possibly derived income both from their land and an enterprise, among them are certainly a subset whose entire income would have been derived from their land. This latter sub-group thus represents a group of truly 'displaced farmers' and it is possible that these constitute the majority of those with no insurance at all. The remaining 37,848 of these 98,103 people dispossessed of their land use rights had been insured under the urban scheme. This group of 37,848 people, while having rights to use land did not derive all (or perhaps in some cases any) of their incomes from their land. Rather, it is likely that they had rights to use the land, which may either have lain fallow or been farmed as a relatively minor sideline, but derived a substantial part (or all) of their income working for an organisation that paid their insurance under the urban scheme. The other 4,992 individuals were people who did not have any land and were previously insured under the urban scheme. Unlike their counterparts who previously had land use rights, these people did not have land to trade for insurance, so they joined town insurance with no compensatory guarantee of insurance longevity and no 'job search' allowance. Table 8 summarizes the land rights, social insurance and other 'benefits' positions of each group prior to and after joining township insurance. Table 8 -----------------On the face of it, it would seem that the 60,255 people previously insured under the rural scheme -many of whom were likely to be displaced farmers with no insurancehave been rendered (at least for the next 15 years) more secure insofar as their social insurance entitlements are concerned. These individuals with land use rights joined the township insurance scheme from either a position of no insurance, or a position of inferior rural insurance. Also on the face of it, it is possible that the small group of 4,992 individuals without land rights previously insured under the urban model are rendered less secure by their transition to township insurance. At least in the worst case scenario, where they receive no X1 component, their basic insurance entitlement has been diminished and added to this, they have no insurance longevity guarantee. Purely in terms of social insurance entitlements, to break even people in this group would have to receive an X1 component that is almost as large as their new 'guaranteed' entitlement. Similarly, those who previously had land use rights who moved from the urban model into township insurance may also have been rendered less secure. Like their counterparts without land use rights, in the event they receive no X1 component, their insurance has been considerably diminished. This group is thus required to accept the benefit of 15 years insurance guarantee and 'job search' allowance as adequate compensation for the loss of their land rights, at least in the immediate future. So at first blush, while some of these individuals -namely the 60,255 dispossessed of land use rights previously either uninsured or insured under the rural scheme -have clearly moved to a better position in terms of immediate social insurance, the position under town insurance of those people previously insured under the urban model is less clear. Their position will differ according to the receipt of X1. Thus, who gets X1 becomes fundamental. While we did not have data on how much X1 any individual received, we could isolate the actual numbers of people who received some X1 component and determine some of their basic human capital and demographic characteristics. In terms of the 60,255 dispossessed land owners previously under the rural insurance scheme, our analysis suggests that despite their transfer into town insurance, any social security enjoyed by this group over and above the base amount is extremely rare. Of these 60,255 people, only 490 -a mere 0.81% -receive an X1 component. In reality though, it is not really surprising to see such a tiny proportion receiving X1 in this group given that many of these people will be displaced farmers -people who may have few of the skills sought by enterprises and thus less likely to be valued enough by employers to warrant X1. However, we would have expected those who moved from the urban scheme to be more likely to receive an X1 component than those who moved from the rural scheme. This is because the enterprise had previously been voluntarily contributing to the urban scheme for these people, presumably because the employer valued their skills. This line of reasoning was borne out by the data with respect to displaced farmers previously insured under the urban model, but not with respect to those nonland owners previously insured under the urban model. Amongst the displaced farmers, 3,256 of the 37,848 (8.6%) previously insured under the urban model received an X1 component with their 15 year insurance guarantee. But amongst the group of 4,992 people who had not previously owned land -and hence received no insurance guarantee with their transition to town insurance -only 23 people (0.46%) received an X1 component. The tiny proportions of X1 recipients must raise the issue of whether it is really legitimate to argue that these people have been moved en-masse into a '25+X scheme', as opposed to a mere '25 scheme with some anomalies'. More worryingly though is the possibility that the scheme is in fact a more systematic 'if……then 25+X' scheme, with structural barriers that disadvantage particular segments of the labour force against the receipt of X1. What seems most inherently worrying about such a scenario is not that it might exist, per se, but that it might exist within the context of the X1 component being heralded as a real incentive, when in any practical sense, X1 may be entirely out of the reach of most employees. In order to discern whether indeed we were looking at a '25 scheme with anomalies' or an 'if……then 25+X' scheme, we further analysed the small proportion of X recipients to create profiles of their basic human capital and demographic characteristics. While we need to bear in mind the small numbers involved in these X1 component analyses, it should also be remembered that these data are for a whole population (or in this case, a subpopulation), not a sample, so our results will not be biased in terms of over-or underrepresentativeness. Furthermore, while the results are limited by the small array of human capital and demographic variables available to us, they nonetheless go some way towards painting an interesting picture of X1 in practice. The results are summarised in Table 9 . Table 9 ----------------------At first blush, analysis of these data did not appear to reveal any particularly stable profile that defined an X1 component recipient. However, when we went a step further and compared the X1 component recipients within each group to the global group profiles, an interesting difference emerged. Across each of the three groups, the proportion of X1 component recipients who were male were several percentage points higher (indeed up to 16 percentage points higher) than the proportion of males in each of the global groups. This difference suggests a systematic gender bias, in favour of males, in the receipt of an X1 component. A simple chi-square analysis revealed that indeed employers do pay an X1 component to a statistically significantly greater proportion of males than females (χ 2 =16.70, p<.001).There were no practical differences though between the age and education profiles of X1 and non-X1 recipients within any of the groups. These observations are quite startling, given that if X1 is designed as a human resource tool to attract and retain good staff it should favour the more experienced or the more skilled. Certainly to the extent that age and education can be seen as proxies for these favourable characteristics, X1 has not been targeted to those human capital strengths. Rather, it is simply being male that most strikingly sets apart those few per-cent getting X1. In the end though, even being male does not make the chances of getting X1 much more than a dream, for in the broader context, this only amounted in real numbers to around 2,200 of more than 103,000 people.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has used the introduction of Shanghai's township insurance scheme as a case study to examine the use of social justice as a correct idea in promoting marketoriented social security to the populace. We use data on the perceptions of Shanghaiese and other urbanites in China's major cities collected in 2002 and 2003 to explain the government's interest in linking social security with social justice. We also use data on the actual implementation of township insurance in one district of Shanghai, representing the position as at the end of 2004, to examine the extent to which the reality of the township insurance reforms conforms to the government's propaganda.
We focused on three questions from the 2002 and 2003 CMMRC surveys: 1) what were the major social problems perceived by residents? 2) how serious was social insurance perceived to be as a problem in 2002 and who considered it to be serious? and 3) how has social insurance as a problem perceived to have changed from 2002 to 2003? While there is considerable diversity across cities and the demographic profiles of respondents, taken together, it is striking that almost a half of those sampled thought that their social insurance position had either not changed or deteriorated between 2002 and 2003. This finding is even the more remarkable given that in 2003 the government spent 20% more on social insurance expenditure for laid-off workers, retirees, pensioners, the unemployed, those who had suffered work-related injuries and those on maternity benefits than in 2002. The results from the attitude surveys also suggest that the disadvantaged segments of society, such as low income earners, are most concerned about social insurance. Thus, it is not surprising that Shanghai's town insurance was promoted primarily as a scheme for these segments. The 2004 findings from the actual implementation of the town insurance scheme in one district suggests that the reality trails significantly behind the rhetoric. While town insurance has had a positive effect on the coverage afforded some, there has been a concomitant dilution in the social insurance coverage of others. In the district considered, it is true that the 60,255 dispossessed of their land use rights constituting 58.45% of those enrolled in town insurance in the district, who previously had either rural insurance or no insurance have improved coverage that is guaranteed for 15 years in the first instance, which then entitles them to receive the basic old-age pension in the future. This group is ostensibly better-off with town insurance, although the trade-off of course is that they have lost forever the security provided by their land. This leaves 42,840 people who have had their social insurance coverage reduced (i.e. 41.55% of those newly enrolled in town insurance who previously received 48% under the urban model). For the 37,848 individuals dispossessed of their land use rights (37.71% of the total) at least their baseline 25% insurance is paid in lump-sum for 15 years, although, again at the cost of losing the security of land use rights. For the other 4992 people there is no guarantee of 15 years coverage, which means that if they lose their jobs they will no longer be covered by town insurance. This is the group that loses the most from the introduction of the scheme. While one of the most lauded features of the town insurance model is the flexibility afforded to top up the baseline contribution with commercial superannuation under the X1 component, our data from the one district suggests the reality does not conform with these objectives with a very small proportion of those participating in town insurance receiving any X1 component at all.
In conclusion, when we consider the status quo of social security policy in China, it becomes evident that the Chinese government is faced with the following difficulties. On the one hand, authoritarian rule allows the government to implement such schemes as Shanghai's town insurance quickly without any public consultation. On the other hand, this same authoritarianism, coupled with high-level official corruption as was evident in Shanghai's pension scandal, is a hindrance to public debate about policy reform. This exacerbates rather than diminishes the concerns of citizens over their social security. Although Shanghai's town insurance scheme has many positive features in relation to the long-term goal of achieving comprehensive coverage, it is also likely that a majority of urban workers will not welcome it. Those who previously received the far more generous benefits under the urban scheme will clearly not welcome it. If the government were prepared to allow greater scope for public debate on the pros and cons of the scheme, it might find itself in the position of facing an unprecedented level of public criticism. For the time being, it is clear that the government faces huge challenges in its capacity to achieve the social justice it claims to be delivering through social security reform. Reference category was a composite of the remaining 28 surveyed cities. 
